India conducted five nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, at the Pokhran range in Rajasthan.
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the underground nuclear explosion test sites at Pokhran in Rajasthan
The first three detonations took place simultaneously at 3.45pm on May 11. These included a 45 kT thermonuclear device, a 15kt fission device and a 0.2 kt sub-kiloton (which is less than a kiloton) device. The two nuclear devices detonated simultaneously on May 13 were also in the sub-kiloton range, 0.5 kT and 0.3 kT.
The test happened months after then foreign secretary K Raghunath told his US counterpart that India did not have any intention of testing a nuclear device. “The test was a secret, known only to five people; that certainly did not include me or even the foreign secretary,” Mansingh recalled.
The test opened floodgates of trouble for India: sanctions, economic and military, and interactional isolation. “It was certainly the biggest challenge Indian foreign policy establishment faced in a long, long time”, said Mansingh, who later became the foreign secretary as well as the country’s envoy to the US.
The immediate challenge was to mitigate international opposition and eventually bridge the trust gap with the US. Immediately after the tests, the US suspended foreign secretary-level talks; over the following two years, it put more than 200 Indian entities under the sanctions list.
The list included not only the facilities of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and entities of Department of Space, but also a clutch of private sector firms that had worked for them.
The now fabled discussions between Strobe Talbot, then US secretary of state, and then foreign minister Jaswant Singh followed — they were held in seven countries, 10 cities, and included 14 rounds of talks.
For Americans and the west, India was gatecrashing the nuclear club. With Pakistan seeking nuclear parity, the Americans feared South Asia would become a nuclear flashpoint. A great deal of the Talbot-Singh conversation covered this ground.
“I hope my regard for the way Jaswant advanced his nation’s interests and sought, as he put it, to harmonise US-India relations speaks for itself...,” Talbot wrote in his book Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb. “These talks provided the basis for the next stage of India-US relationship, and eventually paved the way for the India-US nuclear deal,” says Mansingh.
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the underground nuclear explosion test sites at Pokhran in Rajasthan
The first three detonations took place simultaneously at 3.45pm on May 11. These included a 45 kT thermonuclear device, a 15kt fission device and a 0.2 kt sub-kiloton (which is less than a kiloton) device. The two nuclear devices detonated simultaneously on May 13 were also in the sub-kiloton range, 0.5 kT and 0.3 kT.
The test happened months after then foreign secretary K Raghunath told his US counterpart that India did not have any intention of testing a nuclear device. “The test was a secret, known only to five people; that certainly did not include me or even the foreign secretary,” Mansingh recalled.
The test opened floodgates of trouble for India: sanctions, economic and military, and interactional isolation. “It was certainly the biggest challenge Indian foreign policy establishment faced in a long, long time”, said Mansingh, who later became the foreign secretary as well as the country’s envoy to the US.
The immediate challenge was to mitigate international opposition and eventually bridge the trust gap with the US. Immediately after the tests, the US suspended foreign secretary-level talks; over the following two years, it put more than 200 Indian entities under the sanctions list.
The list included not only the facilities of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and entities of Department of Space, but also a clutch of private sector firms that had worked for them.
The now fabled discussions between Strobe Talbot, then US secretary of state, and then foreign minister Jaswant Singh followed — they were held in seven countries, 10 cities, and included 14 rounds of talks.
For Americans and the west, India was gatecrashing the nuclear club. With Pakistan seeking nuclear parity, the Americans feared South Asia would become a nuclear flashpoint. A great deal of the Talbot-Singh conversation covered this ground.
“I hope my regard for the way Jaswant advanced his nation’s interests and sought, as he put it, to harmonise US-India relations speaks for itself...,” Talbot wrote in his book Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb. “These talks provided the basis for the next stage of India-US relationship, and eventually paved the way for the India-US nuclear deal,” says Mansingh.
This photograph released by the Indian government 17 May shows the
Shakti-3 nuclear site after a nuclear device was detonated underground
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